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1. Introduction 
On December 1 2004 the European Commission announced it would launch an investigation into Britain‟s 
new Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) to establish whether it would break European Union law 
by providing illegal state aid to BNFL. 1 The NDA would inherit most of the liabilities of British Nuclear 
Fuels Limited (BNFL) and the UKAEA, which would be absolved from the responsibility to meet these 
liabilities.2 
The Commission investigation will be interpreted by many as the Commission once again interfering in 
national affairs. By doing this, it could prevent the British government from finally taking responsible 
control of the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, an issue that has been variously, ignored, mishandled 
and even financially exploited by government over the entire history of nuclear power in Britain. However, a 
closer look at the NDA, what it will do and where it will get its funds from suggest that there is plenty to 
complain about with the NDA. Consumers and taxpayers have arguably already paid twice over for 
decommissioning the Magnox plants and under the provisions of the Energy Act 2004 that allowed the 
setting up of the NDA, future taxpayers will have to pay a third time. 
2. What is the Commission case about? 
The Commission‟s concern is the BNFL would be given an unfair advantage in competitive markets. As 
UKAEA is not operating in commercial markets, there is no problem with the transfer of their liabilities. 
State aids are illegal in principle under European Union law because they „distort or threaten to distort 
competition by favouring certain firms or the production of certain goods‟. They can be allowed: „provided it 
can be clearly proved that the negative impact of the aid on trading conditions is outweighed by its positive 
contribution to the fulfilment of other Community objectives.‟3 There is a strange anomaly about how the 
case is being discussed. The British government stated that it had informed the European Commission that it 
would be providing state aid in December 2003, although it said this was for the NDA, not BNFL. Since it is 
BNFL that is being relieved of its liabilities, it is hard to see how the aid could be said to be going to the 
NDA. In response to the Commission‟s announcement the DTI stated: „The Government today welcomed the 
beginning of the European Commission‟s formal investigation into State aid to the NDA.‟4 By contrast, the 
Commission‟s press release makes it clear that it is investigating whether BNFL would be receiving state aid. 
The issue is that BNFL would be split into two parts, the part with the liabilities would pass to the NDA, 
while the rest, particularly the Westinghouse fuel supply, and reactor supply and servicing business, could 
then carry on and perhaps be privatised, unencumbered by these liabilities. In the Commission‟s words: „The 
transfer of the first part to the NDA will be done at no cost to BNFL, that will continue normal commercial 
operations, although this transfer will relieve it from nuclear liabilities that it should normally have met 
under the “polluter pays” principle.‟ 
The British government claims that BNFL‟s own resources, presumably the Nuclear Liabilities Investment 
Portfolio (NLIP) discussed below, will give the NDA ample resources to start its work on April 1 2005 and 
continue until well after the Commission delivers its verdict. As these resources are deemed to be BNFL‟s 
own funds, there is no issue of state aid with these and the start-up of the NDA will not be delayed. 
                                                     
1 European Commission (2004) „State aids: Commission opens formal investigation into UK Nuclear Decommissioning 
Authority‟ IP/04/1430, 01/12/2004, Brussels. (see 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/1430&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui
Language=en) 
2 The British government had informed the European Commission that it would be providing state aid in December 
2003, although it said this was for the NDA, not BNFL. Since it is BNFL that is being relieved of its liabilities, it is hard 
to see how the aid could be said to be going to the NDA. 
3 European Commission (2004) „State aids: Commission opens formal investigation into UK Nuclear Decommissioning 
Authority‟ IP/04/1430, 01/12/2004, Brussels. 
4 Department of Trade & Industry (2004) „Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) still on track for April 2005 
start‟ Press Release P/2004/446. December 1, 2004. 
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2.1. The Westinghouse business 
The Westinghouse business was acquired mainly in 1998-99 when it bought three of the world‟s major 
nuclear power plant vendors. It bought the nuclear power division of the US Westinghouse company in 1998 
and the nuclear division of Swedish/Swiss company ABB in 1999. ABB had already bought another US 
vendor, Combustion Engineering. These acquisitions made BNFL one of the two major reactor vendors and 
it claims to be the largest nuclear fuel supplier worldwide. 
These acquisitions took place at a time when BNFL was in the curious position of having huge liabilities but 
was awash with cash from advance payments for reprocessing fuel for foreign clients at its THORP plant in 
Sellafield. In 2003/04, Westinghouse made a profit of £52m on turnover of £1125m and there is an 
expectation that if the business was made available, buyers would come in. 
3. The NDA 
3.1. What will the NDA do? 
The NDA was set up following publication of the UK government 2002 White Paper, „Managing the nuclear 
legacy: A strategy for action‟.5 Under this, a Liabilities Managing Unit (LMU) was set up within the DTI, 
employing about 20 people. The job of the LMU was to prepare the ground for the establishment of a 
Liabilities Management Authority (LMA), later renamed the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). 
This would inherit sites from the UKAEA and BNFL and manage their clean-up. It would use competitive 
processes to allocate clean-up jobs so although BNFL and UKAEA would lose ownership of their sites, they 
would be able to bid to carry out the work. 
The NDA was established on July 22, 2004 under the 2004 Energy Act6 and it will continue in shadow form 
until it formally commences operations on April 1, 2005. It will inherit most of BNFL‟s assets including the 
Sellafield and Capenhurst sites, the Magnox power stations (11 sites), the Springfield fuel manufacturing 
plant and the Drigg waste disposal site. It will also take on the UKAEA sites, those that were left in public 
ownership when the saleable part of UKAEA was privatised. These include sites of prototype reactors 
(Dounreay, Windscale and Winfrith) and other sites (Culham and Harwell). The total undiscounted cost of 
the liabilities it will inherit were estimated by the NDA to be £50bn. 
3.2. Who will pay for its activities 
 
The 2002 White Paper raised the issue for long-term nuclear liabilities of continuity of funding and the short-
term nature of any funding commitments the government can make under three-year spending reviews. It 
acknowledged that „in the past, nuclear clean up has also been seen as a low priority for funding purposes 
relative to other programmes. Experience to date with UKAEA has therefore been that settlements have 
tended to be the minimum necessary to address safety and environmental needs and that limited funding has 
been available for other projects‟ 
It offered two options for the NDA as ways to provide greater assurance, a „segregated fund‟ and a „statutory 
segregated account‟. The segregated fund would be an identifiable set of assets managed in much the same 
way as a pension fund. Of course, a key difference between a nuclear segregated fund and a pension fund is 
that people putting money into pension funds expect to benefit personally from their contributions. 
Worldwide, it is the preferred method of securing decommissioning funds, because it insulates the funds 
from the fortunes of the company – if the company goes bust, the funds do not go with it – and it is a pot of 
money that is more tangible to the public than a company promise. However, for the government to set up a 
segregated fund would go against government policy. Under this the Treasury has always resisted efforts to 
earmark funds, preferring to have maximum flexibility to use funds in whatever way it sees fit. The Treasury 
argues that this allows it to get the best return on the money at its disposal. 
                                                     
5 Department of Trade & Industry (2002) „Managing the Nuclear Legacy: A strategy for action‟ cm 5552, Department 
of Trade & Industry, London (see http://www.dti.gov.uk/nuclearcleanup/pdfs/whitepaper.pdf) 
6 Her Majesty‟s Government (2004) „The Energy Act 2004‟ HMSO, London (see 
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/20040020.htm) 
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A segregated account would require annual notional payments from tax income towards clean-up and would 
represent a statutory commitment to fund decommissioning but the money would not be in a separate 
identifiable pot. Government would merely provide statutory assurances that the money committed would be 
available when required. In practice, the government would simply be writing „IOUs‟ and the government 
would be able to use the money as it wished until it was actually required. Clearly the latter would be the 
Treasury‟s preferred alternative. 
The White Paper spends several pages arguing the pros and cons of these two options but omits any 
discussion of what appear to be two much more important issues: the time-scale and the „polluter pays‟ 
principle. 
A third of BNFL‟s liabilities are not expected under its plans to fall due until 50-150 years from now. It 
stretches credibility to the limit to assume that a segregated fund created by a private company is sure to 
survive intact, earning interest at the assumed rate for a century forward. But assuming a government will not 
be tempted to get its hands on such a tempting pot of money for 150 years is perhaps even more implausible. 
Current government can set up any legal provisions it likes, but it cannot commit that a future government 
will not repeal all these assurances and, make off with the cash for whatever purposes it chose. If, God 
forbid, there was a major war, would government really resist the temptation to grab these funds to defend 
the country? 
However, it is the „polluter pays‟ principle and, to a lesser extent, the „precautionary principle‟ that is 
conspicuously absent from the argument. The OECD was the first governmental organisation to espouse the 
polluter pays principle and its 1992 definition is: 
‘The polluter should bear the costs of pollution prevention and control measures, and that these 
measures should be decided by public authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable 
state.’ 
In 1999, the British government published its policy on sustainability, „A better quality of life: a strategy for 
sustainable development for the UK’7, which also espoused the polluter pays and the precautionary principle. 
It adopted the definition from the 1992 Rio Declaration which defines the precautionary principle as „where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.‟ 
Remarkably, these two principles do not appear once in the 2002 White Paper. The implication of the 
polluter pays principle in the case of decommissioning nuclear power plants seems clear. Electricity 
consumers should pay for the decommissioning of the plants, so that the fund, however it is kept, should 
contain enough money at the end of the life of the plant to ensure that decommissioning can be paid for. How 
far investment income from the fund after plant closure should be assumed to contribute to the cost is 
another issue we will come back to. 
Neither scheme offered by government comes close to the polluter pays ideal. Contributions would be 
annual, from tax income and would be calculated on the basis of short-term need. If there was no need for 
funds, no contribution would be made and taxpayers 150 years from now would still be paying to clean up 
our nuclear power stations. 
3.3. Provisions for the Magnox plants 
Electricity consumers have already paid for the decommissioning of the Magnox plants. In the 1989 pre-
privatisation accounts of the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) and the South of Scotland 
Electricity Board (SSEB), £3.8bn of assets was set against the decommissioning liability. Taking account of 
inflation and allowing, say, 3% annual real rate of return, this sum should have about doubled by now. This 
notional amount was simply absorbed by government when the industry was privatised and was used to 
subsidise government spending. 
                                                     
7 „A better quality of life: a strategy for sustainable development for the UK’ (Cm 4345, The Stationery Office, London, 
ISBN 0-10-143452-9 
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There was also the Fossil Fuel Levy, which was a sum paid by electricity consumers (10% of their electricity 
bills) from 1990-98, to which electricity consumers contributed about £8bn. Michael Heseltine told 
Parliament this was „to decommission old unsafe stations‟. In fact, it was used for almost anything but that, 
and paid for a new nuclear power plant (Sizewell B) and was unrestricted cash income for Nuclear Electric 
to pay for its losses. Despite its best efforts, Nuclear Electric, the nationally owned company that inherited 
all the CEGB‟s nuclear assets, did not manage to spend it all and £2.7bn remained unspent when the nuclear 
industry was reorganised in 1996. A small amount went to British Energy‟s (the privatised company that 
inherited the more modern nuclear plants) segregated decommissioning fund and the rest went to BNFL, 
who inherited the Magnox plants. There, it was placed in the Nuclear Liabilities Investment Portfolio 
(NLIP), a fund that was separately identified in BNFL‟s accounts, but not strictly segregated. So if BNFL 
had faced bills it could not otherwise have paid, it would have to have drawn this fund down. The NLIP, with 
inflation and some capital growth now stands at about £4bn. 
Two of the Magnox stations were primarily built for military purposes to produce plutonium for bombs and 
therefore arguably not the responsibility of electricity consumers, leaving nine civil plants. If we assume that 
a Magnox plant costs about £1.1bn to decommission, it seems clear that consumers have already paid more 
than enough to discharge their responsibility under the polluter pays principle, and that government took 
most of that money for its own purposes. All that remains of the Magnox provisions is the £4bn in the NLIP. 
This would not be enough to pay for Magnox decommissioning but would be sufficient on projected levels 
of spending at the NDA and with a little interest on investment to fund about 20 years worth of work 
decommissioning them.  
3.4. The NDA budget 
The Treasury, ever eager to find ways to fund its work without taking money from taxpayers, was not slow 
to spot the NLIP and in the White Paper, the government foresaw the NLIP as the initial payment into the 
segregated fund or the segregated account that would fund NDA‟s overall programme. This seemed on the 
face of it to have guarded against the government just absorbing it in return for a promise to deal with the 
clean-up problem. However, it clearly did not meet the polluter pays principle. Why should money 
contributed by electricity consumers for decommissioning Magnox plants go to clear up the mess of military 
programmes, prototype reactors and reprocessing plants? At least the White Paper did promise that the fund 
or account would not subsidise running costs at the facilities still in operation. It said: „The operation of the 
commercial assets – THORP, SMP and the operational Magnox stations – inherited from BNFL would be 
funded separately. The fund would not underwrite their operation.‟ 
Predictably, when the Energy Bill of 2004 was passed, the hand of the Treasury was all to clear. The 
segregated fund option was not chosen and a segregated account, the Nuclear Decommissioning Funding 
Account (NDFA) was set up with the NLIP as its initial endowment. Since the NDFA is not a tangible fund, 
in practice this means that current taxpayers are not being asked to fund anything other than the work that is 
actually carried out and effectively future taxpayers will pay when the work is required. 
In fact, under the Energy Act 2004, the government paid the NLIP into the Consolidated Fund (the 
government‟s general income) with a promise to fund the NDA. With the NDA‟s annual budget expected to 
be about £2bn, the NLIP would cover about 2 years of operation. However, the DTI stated: „Of this [the 
£2bn annual budget], over £1 billion per year will be provided through DTI's Departmental Expenditure 
Limit‟, so government appeared not to be raiding the NLIP to subsidise operation. 
If we look at the NDA‟s proposed budget for its first year (see Table), about half of its expenditure will go 
on running costs. Of this, £480m would go to fund Sellafield operations, £380m to fund the Magnox plants 
and £130m for the Springfields fuel manufacture site. In its first year of operation, the NDA expects to 
receive £1084m as „funds equivalent to forecast receipts from income-generating activities‟. This £1084m is 
made up of about £635m from reprocessing, £307m from electricity generation and the rest (£137m) from 
fuel manufacture (MOX and AGR). So the Magnox plants are expected to make a loss even on only 
operating cost of about £70m. However, £119m of this running cost is for closed plants, presumably to pay 
for the processing of the fuel remaining in the plant at the end of its life, so the remaining operating 
Magnoxes are expected to at least cover their costs. 
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The rest of NDA‟s income comes from two sources: £675m as: „funds equivalent to those transferred from 
BNFL‟, i.e., the transfer from the NLIP, and only £503m from government. Given that government will 
absorb the NLIP from April 1 2005, the £503m from government arguably comes from the NLIP – the NLIP 
was marginal income to the government and the budget to the NDA is marginal expenditure. 
It is difficult to sort out how well the other activities cover their running costs as the MOX plant is at the 
Sellafield site and its running costs are presumably included there while the income from AGR 
(manufactured at Springfields) and MOX fuel manufacture is not separated. However, the Independent on 
Sunday (December 12, 2004) did report that confidential figures suggested that income for the MOX plant 
would exceed expenditure in 2005 by £45m. 
Given the unreliability of the THORP reprocessing plant, the fast ageing of the Magnox plants and the 
dismal history of the MOX plant going over budget and not working reliably8, it will be no surprise if the 
income falls short of the forecast and government will have to find more (effectively drawing down the NLIP 
quicker). 
3.5. Green fields? 
The other aspect that deserves a little examination is the end-point of the clean-up process. Those that had in 
mind that the decommissioning process would end up with „green-field‟ sites, i.e. sites with unrestricted 
usage including food production, will be disappointed. This is despite the fact that the polluter pays principle 
suggests that is where the process should end. Most definitions of this principle require the restoration of the 
environment to an „acceptable‟ state. A guarded restricted area would not come under most peoples‟ 
definition of an acceptable state. If we look at BNFL and UKAEA‟s reports, it is clear this is not 
contemplated and problematic facilities like Dounreay and Sellafield will need to be restricted for hundreds 
of years. 
BNFL characteristically justifies this by pointing out that other industries seem able to get away with such an 
inadequate job, so why should it do better. It states9: 
The Board of BNFL has long estimated its provisions for decommissioning and waste management on the 
assumption that the existing plants and buildings are demolished and sites are cleared, but not to the extent that the 
sites would be returned to farmland. This reflects the approach which industry typically follows where there is no 
requirement in law or otherwise to do more than ensure that an industrial site is made safe. 
Whether there is a realistic alternative to this (i.e., the site could be cleaned up to green-field status if enough 
money was spent) is hard to determine, but if NDA is to avoid inheriting BNFL‟s reputation, it is an option it 
needs to examine. 
Table   The NDA’s draft budget 
Facility Undiscounted 
liability (£bn) 
Decommissioning/
clean up costs 
2005/06 £m 
Operating costs 
2005/06 £m 
Total expenditure 
2005/06 
BNFL 40.3 839.7 993.6 1833.5 
Sellafield inc Drigg 27.5 551.7 483.6 1035.3 
Berkeley 1.1 39.1 0 39.1 
Bradwell 1.1 24.9 39.8 64.7 
Calder Hall 1.1 10.5 12.0 22.5 
Chapelcross 1.1 13.4 53.9 67.3 
Dungeness A* 1.1 5.7 53.0 58.7 
Hinkley Point A 1.1 42.8 12.5 55.3 
Hunterston A 1.1 56.1 0 56.1 
Oldbury* 1.1 0.4 53.7 54.1 
Sizewell A* 1.1 0.4 57.3 57.7 
Trawsfynydd 1.1 45.1 0 45.1 
Wylfa* 1.1 0.6 99.2 99.8 
                                                     
8 In the Independent on Sunday, May 16, 2004 A BNFL spokesman said: "Despite everyone's best efforts, the bloody 
thing does not work." He said its design was so complex that it kept breaking down. 
9 BNFL (2004) „Annual Report and Accounts 2004‟ p 96, BNFL, Warrington 
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Magnox closed  231.9 118.2 350.1 
Magnox operating  7.1 263.2 270.3 
All Magnox 12 239 381.4 620.4 
Capenhurst 0.5 23.2 0 23.2 
Springfields 0.3 25.8 128.6 154.4 
UKAEA 8.083 273.5 0.9 274.4 
Dounreay 4.636 149.7 0 149.7 
Windscale 1.79 25.6 0.9 26.5 
Winfrith 0.548 37.5 0 37.5 
Harwell 1.109 60.7 0 60.7 
Culham 0.249 - - - 
Total 48.4 1113.2 994.5 2107.7 
 
4. Are there alternatives? 
To a large extent, the Commission investigation is a side-show. The liability exists and there is no way to 
avoid it falling on taxpayers. It is galling when a company that has left huge debts appears to walk away 
from them and start up again with a clean sheet – „change the name and do the same.‟ However, the value of 
the Westinghouse assets is dwarfed by the liabilities and most of the business now in the Westinghouse 
division was acquired after these liabilities were incurred. In ethical terms, the best outcome would be if the 
Westinghouse business was sold and the proceeds were to be placed in a segregated fund to pay for the 
clean-up. The Commission tried and failed to pass a Nuclear Directive that would have mandated segregated 
funds and the Treasury has probably vetoed a segregated fund, so the proceeds of any Westinghouse sale will 
go into the „Consolidated Fund‟ and will allow either tax cuts or increases in general government spending. 
So as far as paying for the liabilities goes, the Commission‟s verdict will not change anything significantly. 
From an ethical point of view, cleaning up the nuclear sites should be paid for by government now. The 
„consumers‟ of these sites have had the benefits and government has received at least some of the funds to 
pay for their clean-up. However, expecting the Treasury to surrender about £50bn overnight - £1000 per 
capita – is not realistic. But perhaps over, say, 10 years it could be done. 
The issues of timing, end-point of the process, how the funds are kept and the extent to which interest on the 
funds can be assumed are all interlinked. From a cynical point of view, the long timescale and the 
assumption that funds earn interest indefinitely are very convenient to the government. To pay a debt of £100 
in 150 years time will only require a deposit of £1.18 if a real annual interest rate of only 3% is assumed. But 
assuming the world will remain such a stable place for this period that interest rates of this level would 
continue to be available, the skills and resources to carry out the job would be available and that nothing 
would happen to make accelerating the timetable desirable (e.g., rising water levels) would be heroic. It is 
hard to avoid the conclusion that the government‟s commitment to the polluter pays principle is worthless. 
The job is being done as slowly as possible, to the minimum standard that can be got away with and at the 
lowest possible cost to the current generation. 
If we take the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle seriously, the approach should surely be 
to decommission as quickly as possible, consistent with ensuring the safety of those doing the job, to green-
field site status if it is possible and assuming interest for no longer than, say government bonds are available 
(30 years). A segregated fund that is not reliant on payments from future taxpayers, long into the future does 
not provide absolute protection against subversion of the funds. However, it certainly represents a more 
concrete commitment than the „segregated account‟, which, ultimately, commits the government to do no 
more than it would be obliged to do anyway. 
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Annex    The Liabilities 
BNFL sites 
BNFL sites account for about 85% of the liabilities that the NDA will take on, with an undiscounted value of 
£41.4bn. Of this, BNFL is liable for nearly 70%, £28.3bn and of the rest, 28% is the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Defence and the UKAEA and 12% is to be paid by commercial customers. Discounted at 2.5% a 
year, the £41.4bn reduces to £20.5bn. This £41.4bn is made up of decommissioning (45%), waste 
management (48%) and reprocessing (7%). In terms of timescales, more than a third is projected to take 
place more than 60 years in the future. The breakdown given in the most recent annual report was: 2004-
2014, 30%; 2015-2065, 34%, 2066-2150, 36%. The net liabilities of Magnox Electric, essentially 
decommissioning the plants amount to only £3.7bn in discounted terms, although in the 2002 government 
white paper, the undiscounted cost was estimated as £12bn, reflecting the very long time-scale assumed for 
decommissioning. However, the major component was Sellafield itself (including the Drigg low-level waste 
disposal site, with a total undiscounted cost of £27.5bn. Other BNFL site costs are relatively small, mainly 
Capenhurst (0.5bn) and Springfields (0.3bn). 
The cost of decommissioning the Magnox sites seems to have escalated substantially in the last decade. In 
1996, each station was estimated to cost about £600m to decommission. The stations are all different and 
some will present different problems to others however, work has already been carried out at some stations, 
for example, stage 1 decommissioning has been completed at Hunterston A, Berkeley and Trawsfynydd. The 
remaining liability is about £1.1bn per station, nearly double the estimate from a decade ago. 
UKAEA sites 
The UKAEA‟s liabilities were estimated in the UKAEA annual report (2003/04) as an undiscounted sum of 
£9.39bn. The magic of discounting - assuming that if you need do something in 10 years, you can invest a 
sum now and earn interest so the sum you need now is less than the actual cost – reduces this figure to 
£5.07bn. This is up from the 2003 figure of £3.88bn because the treasury decided that a real interest rate of 
6% was too high and has now required 3.5% to be used. Of the total discounted costs of £5.07bn, £4.82bn is 
recoverable from the DTI under a Letter of Understanding issued by the then Secretary of State for Energy in 
May 1986 and confirmed in June 1996. The balance is recoverable from other customers, or financed from 
up-front payments received by UKAEA. 
Given that, on current plans, clean-up will go on for more than 30 years, during which, a great deal can 
change not least rates of interest available, even the lower discount rate of 3.5% seems a little optimistic and, 
for example, BNFL only assumes a discount rate of 2.5%. The latest plans for the five major sites, published 
in September 2004, yield a significant reduction of the total liability of £8083 and a bringing forward of the 
timetable at most sites (the UKAEA claims up to 75%). Most of the sites are not expected to be brought to 
green-field status and when active decommissioning work is completed, they will enter a „passive safety‟ 
state. So while the UKAEA shows pretty pictures of how it expects the Dounreay site to look, the reality is 
that for 300 years after completion of decommissioning, the site would need „care and surveillance‟ and 
would certainly not be open for unrestricted use. 
Dounreay 
This is the site of the fast breeder reactor programme and is infamous for the shaft into which all manner of 
nuclear waste was thrown. Decommissioning is not expected to be complete before 2036 (markedly shorter 
than earlier estimates which would probably have stretched out till the 22nd century) and the UKAEA has 
said that the main hazards will be made „passively safe‟ in the next 20 years. On the cost of this operation, 
the UKAEA said it „will not be cheap‟10 and that it would cost £2695m. Reflecting these long time-scales, if 
the NDA cost escalation factor of 3.3% is applied, the total cost is estimated to be £4636m. 
Windscale 
This is another infamous site, within the Sellafield complex and housing the Windscale Pile, which was the 
scene of Britain‟s worst nuclear accident in 1957 when the Pile caught fire. It also contains the prototype for 
the AGR programme. In 2004, the estimate cost was about £608m. Decommissioning to the extent of the site 
                                                     
10 http://www.ukaea.org.uk/dounreay/restorepdf/dounreay8.pdf 
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being made passively safe is expected to be completed in 2017 with final clearance by 2065, although clearly 
there is no possibility of the site being released even then. Reflecting these long time-scales, if the NDA cost 
escalation factor of 3.3% is applied, the total cost is estimated to be £1790m. 
Winfrith 
This is the site of some prototype reactors and it is expected decommissioning (the site will be „completely 
cleared‟) will be completed in 2020 and available for non-nuclear use. The estimated cost is £441m, which 
when escalated by the NDA‟s recommended rate of 3.3% amounts to £548m 
Harwell 
Harwell is the headquarters of the UKAEA and is the site of numerous prototype reactors and other facilities. 
It is expected that the site achieve „a passively safe interim end state by 2015 with completion in 2025. The 
total cost is estimated to be £826m and if the NDA escalation factor is applied, this increases to £1109m 
Culham 
Culham is the site of the fusion programme research and development programme. The site is still 
operational and decommissioning work is still at a planning stage. The estimated decommissioning cost is 
£185m, which when escalated at 3.3% amounts to £249m. 
